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In recent years the nature and boundaries of "the duty to act fairly" has 
been the predominant subject of judicial and academic concern in any dis- 
cussion on the application of the rules of natural justice. Now that the 
"fairness" controversy has subsided (due to the highest judicial pronounce- 
ments that natural justice and fairness are synonymous) a new debate on 
the application of natural justice seems likely. This new debate will centre 
over the nature and boundaries of the concept of a "legitimate expectation" 
as the basis of an entitlement to a hearing. And any remaining doubts as 
to the existence or relevance of this concept have now been exploded by 
the recent adoption of the notion not only by the Privy Council in 
Attorney-Gerzerd of Nong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [I9831 2 All ER 246, 
and the House of Lords in O'Reilly v Mackman [I9821 3 All ER 1124, 
1126-1127, but also by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Webster v 
Auckland Harbour Board (unreported) Court of Appeal, CA 5/82, 19 
April 1983 and Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [I9801 2 NZLR 
130, 143. 
Lord Atkin's dictum 
For a period of 40 years the courts in determining whether the rules of 
natural justice applied seemed somewhat mesmerised by a dictum of Lord 
Atkin. In his judgment in R v Electricity Commissioners 119241 1 K B  171, 
204-205, Lord Atkin had declared that the prerogative writs would issue 
to "any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions 
affecting the rights of subjects and having the duty to act judicially". 
A strict adherence to this dictum resulted in a highly conceptual 
approach to natural justice. Thus apart from the judicial insistence on the 
need for the decision maker to be "acting judicially", an unfortunate 
Hofeldian approach was applied by the Courts to the determination of 
what were "rights". Thus in Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne [I9511 AC 66 the 
Privy Council held, obiter, that the decision to revoke a textile dealer's 
licence did not involve a question affecting his "rights" as the decision 
merely withdrew a privilege. The Privy Council therefore concluded that 
the rules of natural justice were not applicable. 
However after the landmark case of Ridge v Baldwin [I9641 AC 40 
and Durayappah v Fernando [I9671 2 AC 337 such arid distinctions ceased 
to have much relevance (see James Aviation Ltd v Air Services Licensing 
Appeal Authority [I9791 1 NZLR 481). Nevertheless as the Court of 
Appeal noted in Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration (supra) even the 
Privy Council opinion in Durayappah v Fernando was dominated by what 
is now seen as a C19th concentration on the rights of property. A new 
analysis was needed and this seems to have been provided by the 'legiti- 
mate expectation" concept. 
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History of the concept 
The notion of a "legitimate expectation" was first implanted into this 
area of law by Lord Denning in Schmidt v Secretary of Stote for the Home 
Department [I9691 2 Ch. 149. In that case alien students of "scientology" 
were refused extensions to their entry permits without being given a hearing. 
In the course of his judgment Lord Denning proffered the view at p.170 
that the application of the rules of natural justice depended on ". . . .whether 
he has some right or interest or I would add, some legitimate expectation, 
of which it would not be fair to deprive him without hearing what he has 
to say". In this way the notion was introduced without any analysis or 
fanfare. 
Not surprisingly it was also Lord Denning who nurtured his creation. In 
a dissenting opinion in Breen v Amalgmated Union of  Engineering 
Wwkers [I9711 2 Q B  175, 191 Lord Denning declared that if a person has 
"some right or interest or some legitimate expectation of which it would 
not be fair to deprive him without a hearing or reasons given then these 
should be afforded him. . . . ." Although Lord Denning was in the minority 
in this case it is clear that Edmund-Davies LJ agreed with him on the 
question of entitlement to natural justice and it is Lord Denning's judg- 
ment which has been frequently cited since. Again in R v Liverpool Cor- 
porarion ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators Association [I9721 2 QB 
299 Lord Denning referred, in argument, at p.304 to a "settled expectation" 
as a thing of value, conferring rights. 
However, an obvious defect with the concept was its lack of precision. 
Perhaps for this reason the notion lay dormant until the High Court of 
Australia made the first real attempt to explore its meaning in Sulemi v 
Minister for Zminigration (1977) 51 ALJR 538. The facts of the case were 
straightforward but the legal dificulties were such that the High Court 
divided 3-3 with Barwick CJ's view consequently prevailing. In that case 
the respondent, through press releases, had promised an amnesty for 
overstayers provided they met certain conditions. The plaintiff, who 
appeared to meet these conditions, applied for an amnesty. Instead of being 
granted such he was deported without a hearing. Barwick CJ in his judg- 
ment placed great emphasis on the aspect of legitimacy. By equating 
"legitimate" with "lawful" Barwick CJ found that the concept added 
little, if anything, to the concept of a legal right. Thus Barwick CJ con- 
sidered that an applicant must possess an expectation based on an enforce- 
able legal right before an entitlement to a hearing arose. However Stephen 
J in the leading dissenting judgment provided a more imaginative analysis 
of the concept. That learned judge defined "legitimate" as "reasonable" and 
stated that "well-founded" expectations should be accorded the same pro- 
tection of natural justice as a person's rights or interests. He explained 
that the source and reason for this principle was quite simply the doctrine 
of fairness. 
Just a few months after Sdemi's case the High Court of Australia 
reconsidered the notion of "legitimate expectation" in Heatley v Tasmanian 
Racing Commission (1977) 51 ALJR 703. This time Barwick CJ's cautious 
approach was rejected by a majority of 5-1. The respondents acting under 
statutory powers had banned the applicant from entering race-courses. 
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This was done without affording him any hearing. In the leading judg- 
ment Aickin J argued that while the applicant could not be said to have 
had an enforceable legal right to enter race-courses he nevertheless did have 
a legitimate expectation of entering them after a payment of a fee. Thus in 
the majority's view the Commission could not disappoint that legitimate 
expectation without a hearing. 
Most recently in Attorney-Generial of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [I9831 
2 All ER 246 the Privy Council dealt with a fact situation strikingly similar 
to that of Salemi's case. In this important opinion the Privy Council also 
expressly rejected Barwick CJ's approach and held that the term "legiti- 
mate" should be equated with the term "reasonable". Their Lordships 
therefore concluded at p.350 that "legitimate expectations. . . . .are capable 
of including expectations which go beyond enforceable legal rights, pro- 
vided they have some reasonable basis". 
With that unequivocal dictum the highest judicial approval has been 
given for a broad approach to be taken. 
Uncertainty of  the Concept 
The task of the courts is now to provide some parameters for this con- 
cept because there is still considerable uncertainty concerning its nature. 
For instance it is unclear whether the relevant "legitimate expectation" is 
an expectation of a favourable decision or simply of a hearing. Most dicta 
assume the legitimate expectation is of a favourable decision - see for 
example, Heatley v Tasnlunian Racing Comnzission (supra) at p.711, 
Salenzi v Minister of  Immigration (supra) per Stephen J at p.554, Chandru 
v Minister of Zmnzigration [I9781 2 NZLR 559 at p.572, Daganayasi v 
v Minister of  Immigration [I9801 2 NZLR 130 at p.143 and Cunningham v 
&*ole (1983) 44 ALR 334 at 343. However there are certainly authoritative 
dicta suggesting the expectation is simply of a hearing - see, for example, 
Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu (supra) at 6.350, Web- 
ster v Auckland Harbozrr Board (unreported) Court of Appeal, CA 5/82, 
19th April 1893, Cinnamond v British Airports Authority [I9801 2 All ER 
368 at p.375 and Nicd v Attorney General for the State of Victoria [I9821 
VR 353 at 357. Although there may often be little difference in the practical 
result, this later formulation presumably provides a less rigorous test to 
satisfy. 
The uncertainty of the concept is compounded by interesting dicta sug- 
gesting that it may be used in areas of administrative law other than natural 
justice. This is discussed below. 
Some Cortclusions 
Despite the confusion there are some tentative conclusions which can 
be derived from the cases. 
Firstly it seems tolerably clear that a "legitimate expectation" can only 
arise from some feature which is substantial, external, and prior to the 
decision in question. Thus in the cases of Salemi v Minister of Immigration 
(supra) and Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu it was the 
express assurances which created an expectation. In Heatley v Tasmanian 
Racing Commission (supra) and O'Reilly v Macknzan [I9821 3 All ER 
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1124 it was the respective parties knowledge of the usual practice in the 
particular circumstances which created it. In Breen v Amdgamated Union 
of  Engineering Workers (supra) it was the fact of the plaintiff's election 
to shop steward (subject to the approval of the district committee) which, 
according to Lord Denning, raised a "legitimate expectation" requiring 
natural justice before a decision to disapprove. Similarly in the context of 
licensing Megarry VC usefully suggested in Mclnnes v Onslow Fane [I9781 
3 All ER 211 at p.268 that apart from the categories of an application or 
revocation of a licence there is an intermediate category where a person 
applies for a renewal of a licence and ". . .the applicant has some legitimate 
expectation from what has already happened that his application will be 
granted". For, as Barwick CJ had previously said in Sdemi v Minister for 
Immigration a lawful expectation may arise where the licensee has fulfilled 
the obligations of the licence. The analysis of Megarry VC was adopted 
by Vautier J in Smitty's Industries v Attorney-Gened [I9801 1 NZLR 
351. 
In all the above examples the applicant's "legitimate expectation" was 
founded upon some act, practice, or situation prior to the decision. It would 
therefore not be possible to argue that a "legitimate expectation" arose 
simply because of the decisionmaker's power to decide in a way adverse 
to the person (see Nushua v Cannon (1981) 36 ALR 215). 
A person may have a subjective hope that an adverse determination 
would not be made but that in itself is generally not a "legitimate expecta- 
tion" (Nichol v Attorney General for Victoria (supra)). In the words of 
Cooke J in the New Zealand Court of Appeal the applicant must have "bons 
fide and substantial grounds", for believing a statutory decision would be 
made in the applicant's favour (Doganayasi v Minister of Immigration 
(supra) at 145). 
The case of Nashua v Cannon also illustrates that the events prior to 
the decision could well indicate a positive absence of any "legitimate 
expectation". In this case the applicant argued that a Ministerial determin- 
ation granting a tariff concession for a fixed period could not be revoked 
during that period without a hearing because, it was argued, revocation 
would disappoint the applicant's legitimate expectation of continuance. 
The argument was unsuccessful. Prior to the determination the Depart- 
ment had indicated that the power of revocation was exercisable at any 
time and therefore Lee J held there was no legitimate expectation of con- 
tinuance. Similarly in Cinnumond v British Airports Authority [I9801 2 All 
ER 368, Lord Denning held that a history of convictions and prior mis- 
conduct on the part of a group of taxidrivers meant they had no legitimate 
expectation of a hearing before a decision was made which prohibited 
them from Heathrow airport. 
A second conclusion can be drawn from the cases. This is the obvious 
point that a broad approach to the concept of a "legitimate expectation" 
will inevitably broaden the ambit of the rules of natural justice. Thus even 
if a person does not possess some interest attracting the rules of natural 
justice under the approach of Durtfyappa v F e r d o  119671 2 AC 337 the 
person may possess a "legitimate expectation" attracting the protection of 
natural justice and thereby render an otherwise nonjusticable decision 
justicable (see Pteterson v Durredin City Council [I9811 2 NZLR 619). For 
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example although natural justice might not normally be applicable to a 
decision because of its high policy content, the existence of a "legitimate 
expectation" might necessitate a hearing in the particular circumstances of 
a case (see Salemi v Minister for Zmmigration (supra), Chandra v Minister 
o f  Immigration (supra) and Attorney-General for Hong Kong v Ng Yuen 
Shiu). A further example of the consequences of a "legitimate expecta- 
tion" is seen on the recent Australian case of Cunningham v Cole (1983) 
44 ALR 334. In that case a person who had applied for reappointment to 
the Public Service had his application refused on the basis of allegations 
of misconduct which were not revealed to him. Sitting in the Federal Court 
Ellicot J noted that normally a person who applied or reapplied for a 
position in the Public Service had no right to a hearing on such questions 
as to whether he was a fit and proper person for the position. However he 
continued to hold that the special facts of the case created a "legitimate 
expectation". The applicant had previously been informed he would be 
offered a position and the allegations were grave - he was therefore 
entitled to a hearing. 
Scope Beyond Natural Justice? 
It has been stated emphatically by Hardie-Boys J in Paterson v Dunedin 
City (supra) that the notion of "legitimate expectation" is confined in 
scope to creating a circumstance where the audi alteram partem rule may 
be applicable. It is also certainly true that most of the cases would support 
this view. However there have been some intriguing indications that the 
notion of "legitimate expectation" may (like the notion of "fairness") 
spread from its origins of natural justice into other areas of administrative 
law. In particular there are dicta hinting that the concept may be used as 
a test for determining what is a "sufficient interest" to give either locus 
standi or grounds of review to an applicant for any type of judicial review. 
In Paterson's case itself Hardie-Boys J seemed to perceive some connection 
with the issue of locus standi (albeit in the context of the audi alteram par- 
tem rule) when he declared at p.624 that "[tlhe essential feature of [the 
legitimate expectation] is the direct and personal effect the exercise of the 
power has upon the individual who comes to Court for redress". 
More significantly Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v Mackman (supra) pro- 
pounded the view at 1 126 that :- 
"In public law as distinguished from private law. . .such legitimate expectation 
gave to each appellant a sufficient interest to challenge the legality of the adverse 
disciplinary award made against him by the board on the ground that in one way 
or another the board in reaching its decision had acted outwith the powers con- 
ferred on it by the legislation under which it was acting; and such grounds would 
include the board's failure to observe the rules of natural justice. . . . ." 
It therefore seems from that passage that Lord Diplock regarded the 
concept as being relevant in determining a "sufficient interest" for the pur- 
poses of review even where the issue was not a breach of natural justice. 
Similar sentiments are apparent in the judgment of Casey J in Jim Harris 
Ltd v Minister of Energy [I9801 2 NZLR 299. In that case the applicant 
sought review of a decision not to award him a contract of coal cartage after 
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a period of twenty-three years during which he had successfully tendered 
for it. He applied for an interim order under section 8 of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972 and he argued that a "statutory power of decision" 
as defined in s.3(b) of the Act was at issue. Statutory power of decision is 
defined therein as a power to make a decision deciding, prescribing, or 
affecting (inter alia) the rights or privileges of any person, or his eligibility 
to receive a benefit or licence, whether he is legally entitled to it or not. 
The respondent argued that the decision did not affect any rights, privileges 
or eligibility to receive a licence. Casey J however responded by stating at 
p.296: ". . .these words in their ordinary meaning are wide ranging, and X 
think 'privilege' and 'benefit' import the concept of 'legitimate expectations' 
which has found favour with the courts in England and Australia in 
determining the ability of a person to apply for review of an administrative 
decision." 
Again it is apparent that this learned judge felt a "legitimate expectation" 
could provide the basis for judicial review on grounds other than natural 
justice and it is noteworthy that in the Court of Appeal's brief discussion 
of the concept in Webster v Auckland Harbour Board (supra) the Court 
cited the Jim Harris case without disapproval. 
The Notion o f  "Fairness" 
However with the concept far from fully settled it may be safer to 
assume that it will in the meantime retain its connection with the rules of 
natural justice. And if so, it seems that the notion of "fairness" will deter- 
mine whether an expectation can be categorised as "legitimate" so as to 
warrant a hearing (see Salemi v Minister for immigration (supra) per 
Stephen J at p.555 and Cunnringham v Cole (supa) per Ellicot J at p.344). 
In this way the criterion of fairness will become not only the dominating 
criterion in the description of content of natural justice but also in the 
determination of its application. Thus the judicial emphasis on the flexibil- 
ity of natural justice and the trend towards widening its ambit will be 
confirmed. 
Nevertheless the importance placed on "fairness" and "reasonableness" 
ensures that judicial regard is paid to the necessity of good, efficient, 
administration. Naturally a concern with good administration may work in 
the applicant's favour as is evident in the Privy Council opinion of 
Attorney-Generd of  Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu (supra). But equally 
not all expectations will be held to be legitimate or reasonable. For example 
in Cunninghm v Cole (supra) Ellicot J suggested, obiter, that if an 
alternative means of redress existed to remove the effects of an adverse 
decision then a legitimate expectation might not exist. Similarly in Nashua 
v Cannon (supra) Lee J noted how an applicant could not reasonably 
expect to be heard on the reasons for the withdrawal of a particular con- 
cession in light of the wide spectrum of broad policy considerations which 
could motivate such a decision. 
However it is mistaken to view the concept of a "legitimate expectation" 
as a potential fetter on efficient, good administration, If there is a "legiti- 
mate expectation" it merely requires the decisionmaker to act with fair 
procedure and this can only be an aid to fair and informed decisionmaking. 
